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HIS article will review the most significant decisions rendered dur-
ing the last term by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the
United States Supreme Court. Both courts continue the trend of
deciding the merits of the case if the error has been substantially
preserved.
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In Santana v. State, the defendant appealed his conviction for Class A
misdemeanor mischief arising out of his unpaid siphoning of electrical
power from a utility line.1 The court first held that, under Texas Penal
Code § 28.03,4 the State did not need to prove pecuniary loss as an ele-
ment of Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief because the defendant's
conduct was within the class described in section 28.03(b)(3)(B), i.e., tam-
pering with a public utility.2 The court also held that any variance be-
tween the information and the evidence at trial was not material or
prejudicial.3 The information charged that defendant diverted power
from a meter and prevented power from being correctly registered. The
defendant claimed that this varied from the evidence at trial because he
could not have diverted power from the meter because it was broken and
that he did not prevent power from being registered because he never
actually tampered with the meter. The court held that the defendant did
not sustain his burden of demonstrating surprise or prejudice because the
information informed the defendant of the charge against him sufficiently
to prepare for trial and would prevent appellant from being prosecuted
again from diverting the electricity that was the subject of the current
prosecution. 4
Hopkins v. State,5 dealt with an appeal of a district court's denial of
Defendant's motion to quash complaint and information. Appellant ar-
gued that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 21.21(6) requires that
an information show that the charged offense was committed on a date
prior to the filing of the information. In Hopkins, the complaint and in-
formation, charging driving while intoxicated, were filed approximately
seven hours after the offense occurred. The Court held that article
21.21(6) requires only that an information reflect that the offense was
committed before the information was filed. Here, the combination of
the state's "on or before" language, together with the state's use of past
tense ("did ... operate"), sufficiently reflected that the offense was com-
mitted prior to filing.
In Gollihar v. State,6 when faced with a sufficiency of the evidence issue
based on the difference between the proof and the indictment, the court
held only a "material" variance will render the evidence insufficient. Ac-
cordingly, "[aIllegations giving rise to immaterial variances may be disre-
garded in the hypothetically correct charge, but allegations giving rise to
material variances must be included." 7
1. 59 S.W.3d 187 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
2. Id. at 195.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 195-96.
5. 46 S.W.3d 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
6. 46 S.W.3d 243, 257 (Tex. Crim App. 2001).
7. Id.
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B. VOIR DIRE
In Wamget v. State, the court of criminal appeals addressed whether
race may be a factor in exercising a peremptory challenge if coupled with
a non-racial reason.8 During voir dire the prosecutor stated that he chose
to exercise a peremptory challenge on a venireperson because she spoke
up more during the defense's voir dire, because she was unemployed, and
because she was born in Liberia. 9 The defendant argued that the prose-
cutor's reference to Liberia was an improper reason for exercising a
strike under Batson v. Kentucky. 10 In affirming the trial court and the
court of appeals, the court of criminal appeals held that the defendant
had failed to sustain its burden of showing that the excluded juror was a
member of a particular ethnicity because ethnicity or ancestry does not
equate with a person's place of birth."l
In Johnson v. State, the court of criminal appeals held that the process
used to demonstrate harm caused by the denial of a challenge for cause
did not change by the promulgation of Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure. 12 This rule states that "[a]ny other error, defect,
irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be
disregarded.' 3 Before the promulgation of this rule, harm was shown
when the appellant used a peremptory challenge to cure the erroneous
denial, exhausted his peremptory challenges, was denied a request for an
additional peremptory challenge, and identified an objectionable
venireperson who sat on the jury.' 4 The court explains that there is no
burden to show harm by a defendant who appeals, but rather it is the
responsibility of the appellate court to assess harm after reviewing the
record. 15 The court finds that in this particular case (but not necessarily
in all cases) the defendant showed harm through the demonstration of
the usual steps and thus his substantial rights had been affected.' 6
In Wadrip v. State, the appellant appealed his conviction for capital
murder.' 7 The jury answered a special issue finding that the defendant's
conduct was deliberate.' 8 The court first holds that the deliberateness
special issue is reviewed under the factual sufficiency standard of review
because, unlike future dangerousness, it requires a finding of historical
fact.19 The court goes on to reject appellant's insufficiency challenge,
finding that appellant's admitted anger and his urge to "lash out" was
8. No. 926-00, 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 64 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2001).
9. Id. at *2.
10. Id. at *2 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
11. 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS, at *22.
12. 43 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
13. TEX. RULE App. PROC. § 44.2(b).
14. Johnson, 43 S.W.3d at 2.
15. Id. at 4.
16. Id. at 7.
17. 56 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
18. This special issue is no longer submitted in trials for offenses committed on or after
September 1, 1991. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071, §§ 2(b), (g) (Vernon 2001).
19. Wadrip, 56 S.W.3d at 599-91.
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indicative of deliberateness. The court also rejected defendant's chal-
lenge to the insufficiency challenge to the jury's affirmative finding of
future dangerousness, holding that the circumstances of the charged of-
fense can be among the factors considered in assessing the likelihood of a
defendant to harm others in the future. 20
In Jester v. State, the court of appeals held that consideration is an ele-
ment of the gambling offenses. 21 Appellant was convicted on five counts
of misdemeanor gambling based on the use of eight-liner machines at his
store. Considering that the definitions for "bet, gambling device, and lot-
tery" all include consideration, the court held that consideration must be
found as an element for conviction. 22 The court further found, however,
that appellant was not entitled to his requested jury instruction on consid-
eration because it was merely a negative definition of consideration, an
element the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 23
Finally, the court held that there was sufficient evidence of consideration
because the jury was free to believe that the distribution of phone cards
in exchange for customer's bets was merely a pretense to evade the law
and thus did not negate the element of consideration.24
In Standefer v. State, the court of criminal appeals addressed whether
asking a juror during voir dire "would you presume someone guilty if he
or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone?" was an improper
attempt to commit the juror.25 The court first defines a commitment
question as one that attempts to bind a juror to a verdict based on a
hypothetical set of facts.26 The court then states that commitment ques-
tions, while usually improper, may be proper if the law requires a certain
type of commitment from jurors, e.g. whether they can consider the full
range of punishment. Finally, to be a proper commitment question, it
must contain "only those facts necessary to test whether a prospective
juror is challengeable for cause."'27 Applying these principles to the ques-
tion asked by defense counsel, the court found the question objectionable
because a breath test refusal may be used to convict a defendant charged
with driving while intoxicated and "[a]bsent statutory direction a chal-
lenge for cause based upon the sufficiency implications of an item of evi-
dence would be inappropriate. '28
20. Id. at 594.
21. .64 S.W.3d 553 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Dec. 5, 2001, no pet. h.).
22. Id. at *5.
23. Id. at *8.
24. Id. at *12.
25. 59 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
26. Id. at 179.
27. Id. at 182.
28. Id. at 183.
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II. TRIAL
A. EVIDENCE
Mata v. State,29 is an appeal of a district court's denial of appellant's
motion to suppress, after State's expert based testimony that appellant
was legally intoxicated at the time of his arrest for suspicion of DWI on
retrograde extrapolation of Appellant's blood alcohol content two hours
after his arrest. The court explained Texas Rule of Evidence Rule 702's
requirements that (1) the expert must be able to clearly explain the appli-
cation of the science to the court; (2) the expert must demonstrate some
understanding of the difficulties inherent in retrograde extrapolation; (3)
the expert must demonstrate awareness of the risks and subtleties of ret-
rograde extrapolation; and (4) the expert must be able to apply the sci-
ence consistently and clearly. 30 Moreover, the court must consider: (1)
the length of time between the offense and the subsequent tests; (2) the
number and timing of the tests given; and (3) whether the expert knew of
any individual characteristics of the defendant tending to alter the typical
assumptions employed in retrograde extrapolation (e.g., high body
weight). Noting that the expert's testimony in this case was based on no
knowledge of any individual characteristics of the defendant and only a
single breath test, conducted more than two hours after arrest, the court
concluded that the State had not proven reliability by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. The court of criminal appeals remanded to the court of
appeals for a determination of the harm caused appellant by admission of
the expert's testimony.31
Maxwell v. State32 dealt with an appeal to determine whether the dis-
trict court committed reversible error in failing to permit appellant to
impeach a key State witness by attempting to show that the witness was
serving deferred adjudication probation at the time of trial. Here, the wit-
ness was serving deferred adjudication probation for a 1996 charge of
possession of cocaine and had been convicted of possession of marijuana
in 1998, thus violating the terms of his deferred adjudication. The court
reversed the court of appeals' affirmance, holding that the introduction of
a witness' potential motive, bias, or interest through evidence of his de-
ferred adjudication probation was permissible, and it remanded the case
to the court of appeals for a harm analysis. 33
In Bustamante v. State,34 during the defendant's murder trial, in which
he had not testified, his counsel asked a State's witness what types of
gangs were in Bustamante's neighborhood. The State objected, and the
judge stated "as soon as I hear from the defendant, we'll get into it.'35
29. 46 S.W.3d 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
30. Id. at 916.
31. Id. at 917.
32. 48 S.W.3d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
33. Id. at 200.




The court of appeals held that comments by the judge were excluded
from analyses based on McCarron v. State,36 which held that error arises
only when comments as to the defendant's failure to testify are made
after the defendant closes his case. The court reversed, holding that this
was a misapplication of McCarron, in which timing of the comment was
relevant, not dispositive. 37
In Vasquez v. State,38 the appellant contended that evidence was insuf-
ficient to support jury's deadly weapon finding because the only testi-
mony purporting to establish this fact came from an accomplice, and was
otherwise uncorroborated, and that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
art. 38.14 requires corroboration. The court of appeals held that the arti-
cle requires corroboration where the deadly weapon finding is entered
because of the jury finding appellant guilty as charged in the indictment.39
Nevertheless, the court of appeals found sufficient corroborating evi-
dence in the record. The court of criminal appeals affirmed, holding that
because the court of appeals found non-accomplice evidence connecting
appellant to the crime charged, there was no need for non-accomplice
corroborating testimony connecting him to the use of a deadly weapon. 40
1. Fourth Amendment
In Hernandez v. State, the court of criminal appeals reversed the lower
court's determination that admission of evidence seized in violation of
the Fourth Amendment was non-constitutional error.41 Appellant was
convicted for possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver. The court
of appeals found that the evidence was seized in violation of appellant's
Fourth Amendment rights and should have been excluded, but that such
error was non-constitutional. 42 In reversing, the court of criminal appeals
held that because exclusionary rules are constitutionally based as they are
"derived from liberties and restrictions contained in the amendments"
the harm analysis based on an error in the admission of evidence ob-
tained in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be the constitutional
standard of Texas Rule of Criminal Procedure 44.2(a).43
In Illinois v. McArthur, police officers, with probable cause to believe
respondent McArthur had hidden marijuana in his home (a statement
from his wife), prevented him from entering the home, unless accompa-
nied by a police officer, for about two hours while they obtained a search
warrant.44 Once they obtained the search warrant, the officers found
drug paraphernalia and 2.5 grams of marijuana.
36. Id. at 764 (citing McCarron v. State, 605 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)).
37. Id. at 766.
38. 56 S.W.3d 46, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 48.
41. No. 861-00, 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 104 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 14, 2001).
42. Id. at *2.
43. Id. at *5-6.
44. 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
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The circuit court granted defendant's motion to suppress the evidence
as the fruit of an unlawful seizure, that is, "the refusal to let him reenter
his home unaccompanied. ' 45 The State appealed. The appellate court
affirmed; the Illinois state court denied the State leave to appeal, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court held that given
the nature of the intrusion and the law enforcement interests at stake, the
brief seizure of the premises was reasonable and did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. The Court found that since the police had probable
cause to believe drugs were on the premises, the evidence would have
been destroyed if McArthur had been allowed to reenter the trailer
alone, the police made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforce-
ment needs with the demands of personal privacy, and the restraint was
for a limited time that was no longer than necessary, the search was
reasonable. 46
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the petitioners, ten maternity pa-
tients at the Medical University of South Carolina ("MUSC") who were
arrested after testing positive for cocaine in urine tests administered by
the hospital pursuant to a policy developed in conjunction with the police
department, sued MUSC, hospital personnel and various state, city, and
police officials. 47 The patients claimed that the tests were warrantless,
nonconsensual searches conducted for criminal investigation purposes,
and therefore, unconstitutional. Respondents contended that the
searches were consensual, and that even if there was no consent, the
searches were reasonable because they were justified by a non-law en-
forcement purpose.
The district court held that the tests were not done for an independent
purpose, since there was an agreement that the police would be called if
drug tests were positive.48 The district court instructed the jury that un-
less they found that the tests were consensual, they were required to find
for the petitioners. The jury found for the respondents. The Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Fourth
Circuit's judgment. The Court held that the tests were "searches" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and that in view of the hospital
policy's law enforcement purpose, the test and the reporting of positive
tests to the police were unreasonable searches absent the patient's con-
sent. The Court found that patients undergoing tests at a hospital have a
reasonable expectation that the results of any tests will not be shared with
non-medical personnel without the patient's consent. 49
In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,50 the appellant was arrested for failing
to wear a seatbelt, which is a fine-only offense in Texas. The officer ar-
rested appellant and took her to jail. Appellant plead no contest, but she
45. Id. at 326.
46. Id. at 331-32.
47. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
48. Id. at 73-74
49. Id. at 78.
50. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
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appealed based on the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unneces-
sary seizure. The United States Supreme Court rejected appellant's re-
quest to make a new rule of constitutional law that would prohibit
officers from making an arrest, even with probable cause, if the convic-
tion was a fine only offense and there was no need for immediate deten-
tion. Acknowledging the somewhat egregious facts of this particular
case, the Court refused to create standards for the Fourth Amendment
that would lead to sensitive case-by-case determinations of the officer's
need and, as a result, found the arrest satisfied the constitutional
requirements. 51
In Badgett v. State,52 appellant was arrested for suspicion of drunk driv-
ing after a car accident and refused to give a blood sample voluntarily, so
one was taken at the hospital pursuant to §724.012(b) of the Texas Trans-
portation Code against appellant's wishes. Appellant filed a motion to
suppress the sample which was denied. On appeal, the court of criminal
appeals reversed and remanded the case because the sample was not
given in compliance with § 724.012(b). Under § 724.012(b), to take a
blood sample: 1) there has to be a life-threatening accident; 2) the defen-
dant must be arrested for DWI; and 3) the arresting officer have had rea-
son to believe that the accident happened as a result of the offense. The
court of criminal appeals held that the officer's belief must be based upon
specific and articuable facts apart from the accident and the driver's in-
toxication and, as a result, the case was reversed and remanded to get the
basis of the officer's belief regarding causation. 53
In Garcia v. State,54 police officers responded to an anonymous tip that
Defendant was in the possession of marijuana. Police followed defen-
dant's truck and eventually stopped the vehicle. While pursing the vehi-
cle, a child inside repeatedly looked back at the police officer tailing the
truck. At the stop, the child had its seat belt on, but one of the passen-
gers did not have his seat buckle fastened and the driver could not pro-
duce valid insurance. Upon questioning the driver about possession of
marijuana, he consented to the searching of his residence and another
car, leading the police to find over 400 pounds of marijuana. Defendant
filed a motion to suppress, which was denied, and then plead guilty. The
court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling on the motion to sup-
press, finding that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the
car. The court of criminal appeals agreed, finding that the mere fact that
the child passenger looked back several times was not enough to support
a stop for failing to wear a seat belt. Accordingly, the court held that
there was not enough evidence to support the officer having reasonable
suspicion to stop the truck based on a belief the child was not wearing a
seat belt.55
51. Id. at 347.
52. 42 S.W.3d 136, 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
53. Id. at 138-39.
54. 43 S.W.3d 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
55. Id. at 531-32.
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In Amir v. State,56 the defendant appealed a denial of a motion to sup-
press in which the defendant argued that the Houston Police Depart-
ment's search of the premises exceeded the scope of the warrant. The
premises at issue was a building divided into two halves, each with its own
address. Police search the side of the building covered by the warrant
and continued into the other side of the building where they found co-
caine, paraphernalia and a gun. Relying in part on similar federal cases
such as United States v. Prout,57 the court of criminal appeals held that
the search was valid because the record indicated that the defendant had
manipulated the address of the second area and that the second area was
at one point listed as defendant's residence. 58
2. Fifth Amendment
In Griffith v. State, the appellant argued that his constitutional rights
were violated by the admission, as substantive evidence of guilt, of a re-
cording of his request for counsel when he was asked to take a breath-
alcohol test as part of a DWI investigation.5 9 The court of criminal ap-
peals first held that because the appellant's statements were not produced
by custodial interrogation, the appellant had no Fifth Amendment right
to counsel, and consequently there was no constitutional right infringed. 60
Similarly, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not at-
tached because appellant did not become an "accused" protected by the
Sixth Amendment simply because the State had detained him with the
intent of filing charges against him.61 Finally, appellant had not been
compelled to testify against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment
because appellant had in no way been coerced into requesting an
attorney.62
In Burden v. State, the court of criminal appeals held that a defendant
charged with promotion of obscenity need not know that a videotape is
obscene to be convicted, but need only know the material's content and
character. 63 The statute making promotion of obscenity a crime still con-
tains a scienter requirement as it states that a person commits an offense
if "knowing its content and character, he promotes ...with intent to
promote any obscene material or obscene device." 64 Additionally, the
court held that it was not error for the trial court to exclude the defen-
dant's proffered evidence obtained from the internet because he failed to
demonstrate a resemblance between the proffered evidence and the al-
legedly obscene materials and because he did not present proof that the
56. 45 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
57. Id. at 91 (citing United States v. Prout, 526 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976)).
58. Id. at 89.
59. 55 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
60. Id. at 603.
61. Id. at 604.
62. Id. at 607.
63. 55 S.W.3d 608, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
64. TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.23 (West 2001).
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internet materials were accepted in the community.65
In State v. Boyd, appellees were charged with failure to report a hazing
incident which occurred on the campus of Texas A&M University. 66 The
trial court granted appellees' motion to dismiss the charge based upon its
determination that Texas Education Code Annotated, section
37.152(a)(4) is unconstitutional as applied to the appellees. The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the charge. The Court of
Appeals stated that section 37.152(a)(4) of the Texas Education Code
compelled disclosure of such information from the appellees and that it
created a real and appreciable risk of self-incrimination and was there-
fore unconstitutional. 67
The court of criminal appeals reversed the court of appeals judgment.
The court found that while the court of appeals correctly determined that
section 37.152(a)(4), standing alone, violates the Fifth Amendment, the
court of appeals, however, failed to sufficiently analyze the immunity pro-
vision to the hazing statute contained in the Texas Education Code Anno-
tated section 37.155 (Vernon 1996). The immunity from civil or criminal
liability granted in section 37.155 is "sufficient to remove any real or ap-
preciable hazard of self-incrimination and to compel reporting over a
claim of privilege. '68
In Nonn v. State,69 appellant was convicted of capital murder and ap-
pealed on the basis that the trial court erred in admitting appellant's con-
fession made in Illinois into evidence at trial. The court of criminal
appeals drew comparisons to Davidson v. State,70 in that the court there
held that the rule of conflict-of-law resolution is that the law of the forum
in which the judicial proceeding is held determines the admissibility of
evidence. However in this case, the court of criminal appeals held that
these statements should not have been admissible at trial. The focus was
on article 38.22 which deals with electronic recordings and does not make
any distinction between in-state and out-of-state oral statements. Since
the appellant's confession in Illinois did not comply with article 38.22, the
confession was improper and should not have been admitted into evi-
dence. Accordingly, the court vacated the decision and remanded the
case for a new trial.71
3. Sixth Amendment
In Thompson v. State, following appellant's conviction for murder the
State introduced evidence that appellant, while awaiting trial in prison,
had sought to hire someone to murder the State's two key witnesses.72
65. Burden, 55 S.W.3d at 616-17.
66. 38 S.W.3d 155, 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
67. Id. at 156.
68. Id.
69. 41 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
70. Id. (citing Davidson v. State, 25 S.W.3d 183 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)).
71. Id. at 185.
72. No. 73,431, 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 87 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 2001).
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The State, relying on a tip from another inmate, utilized an undercover
officer to tape record appellant attempting to solicit someone to murder
witnesses. Appellant claimed that the admission of the tape recording
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the State knew
defendant was awaiting trial and yet did not disclose that he was being
interrogated by the State. The court agreed. While it is true that such
informants may be used to elicit evidence pertaining to criminal conduct
that has not yet been charged, here the evidence was used in the same
case to help the State establish that appellant posed a continuing threat to
society.73
In Thumann v. State, the court of criminal appeals upheld appellant's
conviction for theft.74 The court initially found that there was sufficient
evidence on which to base appellant's conviction because even if the jury
believed that appellant was a business partner of the victim, a partner
does not have the right to deal with partnership property as his own, i.e.,
sell it and retain the proceeds.75 The court also found that the defendant
was not entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of ownership because
this instruction would do nothing more than negate the consent element
of the theft offense. 76
B. JURY CHARGE
In Johnson v. State,77 the court of criminal appeals vacated and re-
manded the defendant's sentence when the trial court denied two of the
defendant's challenges to jury members for cause. The court of criminal
appeals held that the defendant had properly shown harm by: 1) using
peremptory challenges to remove the venire members; 2) exhausting his
peremptory challenges; 3) requesting additional peremptory challenges
and was denied; 4) identifying two objectionable venire members who
ultimately sat on the jury; and 5) indicating on the record that he would
have used additional peremptory challenges to strike these two objection-
able jury members. Because Defendant showed harm in the trial court's
ruling, the Court granted Defendant a new trial.
In Ferrel v. State, the court of criminal appeals expounded on the de-
fendant's entitlement to jury instructions on defenses and on lesser-in-
cluded offenses. 78 The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault for
striking and killing a fellow bar patron with a beer bottle. 79 Defendant
requested, and was denied, jury instructions on self-defense and the
lesser-included offense of misdemeanor assault. The court held that in
order to be entitled to an instruction on misdemeanor assault there must
be some evidence that the victim did not suffer serious bodily injury and
73. Id. at *26.
74. 62 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.).
75. Id. at 252.
76. Id.
77. 43 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
78. 55 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
79. Id. at 587.
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that the defendant did not use or exhibit a deadly weapon.80 Because the
evidence conclusively showed that the victim had, in fact, been killed, the
defendant was not entitled to the lesser-included offense instruction.
81
Finally, the court held that because the defendant used deadly force, he
was not entitled to the self-defense instruction he requested under section
9.31 of the Texas Penal Code because that section is reserved for cases
involving non-deadly force. 82
In Hammock v. State,83 the appellant contended that Texas Rule of Ev-
idence 105(a) does not require that an objection and request for limiting
instruction be made at the time the testimony in question is admitted, in
order for one to be entitled to a limiting instruction. The court disavowed
Garcia v. State84 to the extent that it held that an objection to admission
of testimony is required before a limiting instruction can be requested.
However, the court declined to disavow Garcia's requirement that a lim-
iting instruction must be requested at the time the objectionable testi-
mony is admitted. The court's underlying rationale was that limiting
instructions that are requested long after the objectionable testimony is
admitted are simply not effective. 85
C. PUNISHMENT
In Scott v. State, the appellant claimed that the State had unlawfully
enhanced a subsequent charge with a successfully completed deferred ad-
judication.86 Appellant pled guilty in 1991 to the offense of indecency
with a child and received deferred adjudication probation, which he com-
pleted successfully. He was later convicted of aggravated sexual assault,
and the trial court permitted the State to use appellant's prior deferred
adjudication to enhance appellant's sentence.87 The trial court relied on
section 12.42 of the Texas Penal Code, which provides that a life sentence
must be assessed to a defendant who commits aggravated sexual assault if
the defendant has been convicted of a sexual offense enumerated in the
section, including indecency with a child. 88 However, prior to a 1997
amendment of section 12.42, a deferred adjudication was not considered
a conviction under section 12.42.89 Because the amendment occurred
subsequent to appellant's conviction, application of the section violated
the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution.90
In Jordan v. State, the appellant pled guilty to the second degree felony
of delivery of more than one but less than four grams of cocaine and was
80. Id. at 589.
81. Id. at 591.
82. Id. at 592.
83. 46 S.W.3d 889, 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
84. 887 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
85. Hammock, 46 S.W.3d at 893.
86. 55 S.W.3d 593, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
87. Id. at 595.
88. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(c)(2)(A), (c)(2)(B) (Vernon 2001).
89. Scott, 55 S.W.3d at 595-96.
90. Id. at 597-98.
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placed on deferred adjudication community supervision.91 Later, the dis-
trict court revoked Jordan's community supervision. Immediately after
the revocation of community supervision, and during the same proceed-
ing, Jordan plead guilty to the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, a
state jail felony. The prior conviction (the revocation) was then used to
permit a two-year sentence of incarceration on the unauthorized use of a
motor vehicle charge under the then existing version of Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, article 42.12 § 15.
The court of appeals held that the trial court could not impose a prison
sentence on the defendant for the motor vehicle charge, since the cocaine
charge was not final. The court of criminal appeals affirmed the court of
appeals decision. The court held that at the time the trial judge sentenced
the appellant to state jail in connection with the primary offense of unau-
thorized use of a motor vehicle, the appellant still had the opportunity to
file a motion for new trial in the proceedings involving the drug delivery
charge, therefore the prior conviction was not final and could not be used
to deny the appellant community supervision in the primary offense.92
In Orrin Waits v. State,93 appellant was convicted of a state-jail felony,
possession of a controlled substance. The jury found the enhancement
allegations to be true and appellant was sentenced to fifteen years. The
court of appeals affirmed, holding that section 12.42(a)(2) of the Texas
Penal Code permits two sequential prior felony convictions, one of which
is for a state-jail felony, to enhance a non-aggravated state-jail felony to a
second-degree felony. The court remanded for consideration in light of
the holding in Campbell v. State,94 issued two months before this case,
that the terms "felony" and "state-jail felony," as used in section
12.42.(a)(2), are mutually exclusive. 95
In Ex parte Millard,96 Millard brought a writ of habeas corpus to have
the court decide the question of whether a state inmate who is acciden-
tally released while serving two consecutive sentences is entitled to credit
on both sentences for the time in which he was unconfined. Millard was
erroneously paroled through no fault of his own. He was not eligible for
parole on the first sentence because the second sentence was to begin
whenever the first sentence terminated, and he was not eligible for parole
on the second sentence because he had not yet served enough of it. The
court held that Millard was entitled to receive credit for his unconfined
time.97
In Pettigrew v. State,98 appellant was convicted in 1995 of aggravated
sexual assault and was given ten years of community supervision in lieu of
91. 36 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
92. Id. at 877.
93. 46 S.W.3d 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
94. 49 S.W.3d 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
95. Id. at 889.
96. 48 S.W.3d 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
97. Id. at 193-94.
98. 48 S.W.3d 769, 770 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
2002]
SMU LAW REVIEW
a ten-year sentence. Appellant subsequently committed a murder and
was sentenced to 75 years. The district court revoked his community su-
pervision and sentenced him to ten years for the 1995 assault, stacking the
sentence onto the 75-year murder sentence. The court of appeals held
that the sentences could not be stacked because the assault conviction
was prior to the murder conviction, stacking is dependent on the order of
convictions, and only subsequent convictions can be stacked. The court
of criminal appeals reversed, holding that, for purposes of stacking, a case
can be treated as a "conviction" when the sentence is either suspended or
imposed. 99 Therefore, for purposes of stacking, the district court had the
discretion to treat the assault conviction as occurring when the sentence
was suspended, or when it was imposed.
In Lofton v. State,100 the court of criminal appeals held that the trial
court did not err in not including lesser included offenses in the jury
charge and that, as a result, the defendant suffered some harm. The test
espoused by Wesbrook v. State10' requires: (1) that the lesser-included
offense must be included within the proof necessary to establish the of-
fense charged, and (2) some evidence must exist in the record to permit a
jury to rationally find that if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty only of
the lesser included offense. The defendant, who was convicted for assault
of a public servant, claimed he was entitled to an instruction regarding
the lesser included offense of resisting arrest. The court of criminal ap-
peals found that since the defendant had struck the arresting officer in
the face twice prior to the arrest, there was no reason for the jury to
believe that resisting arrest was a viable alternative to assault of a police
officer. Since the second prong of the Wesbrook test was not met, the
conviction was allowed to stand.
In Campbell v. State, the appellant was convicted in district court of
possession of cocaine weighing less than one gram with the intent to de-
liver,102 an unaggravated state jail felony punishable under section
12.35(a) of the Texas Penal Code. After appellant pled true to allegations
of two prior state jail felony convictions, the jury assessed punishment at
eight years confinement. Campbell appealed, complaining that the trial
court erred by instructing the jury that under section 12.42(a) of the Texas
Penal Code the range of punishment for an unaggravated state jail felony
punishable under section 12.35(a) with two prior sequential state jail fel-
ony convictions is two to twenty years confinement, a second degree fel-
ony rather than two to ten years, a third degree felony. The court of
appeals affirmed the appellant's conviction. The court of criminal ap-
peals reversed and remanded for a new punishment hearing. The court
held that as used in subsection 12.42(a) the terms "felony" and "state jail
felony" are mutually exclusive; a defendant charged under subsection
99. Id. at 771.
100. 45 S.W. 3d 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
101. 29 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
102. Campbell, 49 S.W.3d at 874-75.
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12.36(a) who has previously acquired only state jail felony convictions,
whether sequential or non-sequential, must be punished for a third de-
gree felony under subsection 12.42(a)(1), rather than a second degree fel-
ony under subsection 12.42(a)(2). 10 3
In Carroll v. State, Appellant pled guilty in district court to two counts
of delivery of marijuana. 10 4 The trial court accepted her pleas and sen-
tenced her to concurrent five year sentences and a $5,000 fine. Defen-
dant appealed her sentence, alleging that the trial court erred by coercing
her to testify at the sentencing phase of her hearing. The court of appeals
initially reversed and remanded, but thereafter, withdrew its opinion and
affirmed the lower court decision.
Upon review to the court of criminal appeals, the court found that the
appellant's guilty plea did not waive her right against self-incrimination as
to sentencing. The court recognized that the law at the time of the appel-
lant's plea was unsettled on this matter. It became settled with the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell v. United States.10 5 In
Mitchell, the Supreme Court ruled that although the witness has pleaded
guilty to a crime charged but has not been sentenced, his constitutional
privilege remained unimpaired. In the instant case, although the appel-
lant was warned about the waiver of her right to silence in the guilt phase,
she did not receive a similar warning in the sentencing phase. In fact, the
trial court told her that she did not have any such right. From the facts
before it, the court stated it could not conclude that the appellant know-
ingly, voluntarily, or intelligently waived her Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. Neither could the court conclude, after Mitch-
ell, that the trial court may consider invocation by the appellant of her
right to silence as a circumstance against her when determining her pun-
ishment. The case was reversed and remanded.1 06
In Cooper v. State,10 7 appellant attempted to negate a plea bargain he
entered into for his felony offense because he claimed it was not knowing
and voluntary because the trial court did not fully admonish appellant
about his waiver of a right to appeal. The court of criminal appeals up-
held appellant's sentence, holding that the voluntariness of a guilty plea
cannot be raised on appeal from a plea-bargained conviction because the
legislature barred this type of appeal in a 1977 amendment to Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure article 44.02. Additionally, the court reasoned
that a cost-benefit analysis leans in favor of denying such appeals because
the number of felony cases in which a plea is not entered into voluntarily
is relatively small compared to the glut of meritless appeals the court
would be faced with if such an appeal was allowed.108
In Ex parte Busby, the applicant was convicted in June 1988 of theft
103. Id. at 878.
104. 42 S.W.3d 129, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
105. 526 U.S. 314 (1999).
106. Id.




and sentenced to 10 years in prison. 109 On March 18, 1988, 64 days later,
the applicant filed a motion for shock probation. On August 16, 1988,
more than 180 days after the sentence was executed the court granted the
motion. Subsequently, the applicant's probation was revoked. Applicant
filed a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus contending that the trial
court did not have jurisdiction to release him to shock probation, and
therefore, he is entitled to credit for the time he spent released from Au-
gust 16, 1988 until August 1992. The court of criminal appeals granted
the applicant's writ. The court held that when a defendant makes a
proper and timely request for shock probation, but the trial court's order
is made after it has lost jurisdiction and is therefore void, the defendant
will be entitled to time credit for the time spent on release due to the
erroneous order.'10
III. APPEAL
In Vidaurri v. State,"' appellant pled guilty to a felony charge of inde-
cency with a child and received ten years deferred adjudication probation
pursuant to a plea bargain. Subsequently, the State alleged that appellant
had violated three conditions of his probation and moved to proceed with
adjudication. The appellant pled that all three alleged violations were
untrue, and he was adjudicated guilty of the original charge and sen-
tenced to twelve years. The court of appeals held that rule 25.2(b)(3) of
the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure limits a defendant's right to ap-
peal on an issue separate from defendant's conviction (i.e., the truth of
defendant's probation violations). The defendant had failed to preserve
error by timely objecting or moving for a new trial. The court of criminal
appeals reversed the first of these holdings and affirmed the second. As
to the first, the court reasoned that defendant's appeal was based on the
sentence received for the adjudication of guilt, not on his probation viola-
tions, and therefore Rule 25.2(b)(3) did not limit his right to appeal. As
to the second, the court held that appellant waived his statutory right to
have a separate punishment hearing wherein he could present evidence
by failing to timely object, and that objections based on deprivation of
punishment hearings were not limited by Rule 25.2(b)(3) because they
addressed the process of sentencing, rather than the conviction itself.
112
In Nix v. State," 3 appellant pled no contest to misdemeanor theft and
was given deferred adjudication probation. No record was made of the
proceeding, and no appeal was timely filed. Appellant subsequently vio-
lated his probation conditions and was sentenced to one year. The court
of appeals held it had no jurisdiction because appellant had neither ob-
jected nor moved for a new trial at the probation proceeding, and the
109. No. 73,797, 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 20 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2001).
110. Id. at *6.
111. 49 S.W.3d 880, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
112. Id. at 886.
113. No. 793-00, 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
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court of criminal appeals affirmed. Appellant argued that his case fell
within one of the exceptions to Manuel v. State,' 14 which held that one
could appeal on issues relating to the plea proceedings only if appeal was
taken immediately after deferred adjudication is entered. The exceptions
are where the judgment is void, or where the claim is cognizable on a writ
of habeas corpus. The court held that Manuel was statutorily-derived, did
not create a new rule, and that appellant waived his right to appeal the
plea proceedings because he failed to timely file an appeal.115
In Salazar v. State, the appellant was convicted by a jury of capital mur-
der for the death of his girlfriend's two-year old daughter and was sen-
tenced to death.116 On direct appeal to the court of criminal appeals the
appellant, in points of error six through nine, claimed that the trial court
erred in denying him a new trial because the jury's extrinsic to the record
discussion of inaccurate parole information during jury deliberations con-
stituted jury misconduct. The appellant claims this deprived him of his
Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial, and violated his Four-
teenth Amendment due process rights and his rights under Article 1, sec-
tion 10 of the Texas Constitution. The court of criminal appeals found
that because the evidence presented was conflicting and inconsistent, the
court could not say that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding
that the factors set forth in Sneed v. State' 17 were not met and in denying
the appellant's motion for new trial. The Sneed case holds that a jury's
discussion of parole constitutes reversible error when a defendant shows:
(1) a misstatement of law; (2) asserted as a fact; (3) by one who professes
to know the law; (4) and is relied upon by other jurors; and (5) who for
that reason changed their vote to a harsher punishment.11 8
IV. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In Garcia v. State, the appellant claimed he was denied ineffective assis-
tance of counsel when, during the punishment phase following appellant's
conviction for murder, his counsel solicited testimony from the appel-
lant's expert witness that included damaging testimony on the relation-
ship between race-appellant is Hispanic-and a subject's continuing
danger to others.' 19 The record did not show what counsel's reasons for
the questioning were, and such questions could have been an attempt to
place before the jury all the factors it should use in its assessment of fu-
ture dangerousness and to persuade the jury that despite any negative
factors the appellant would not be a future danger if sentenced to life in
prison. 120 The court thus held that given appellant's lengthy and violent
criminal record, it could not say that counsel's conduct could not be con-
114. 994 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
115. Id.
116. 38 S.W.3d 141, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
117. 670 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
118. Sneed, 670 S.W.2d at 266.
119. 57 S.W.3d 436, 438 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
120. Id. at 440-41.
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sidered sound trial strategy. 121 The court also held that there was suffi-
cient evidence to support the jury's finding that appellant was a
continuing threat as the evidence showed that appellant had multiple
prior convictions, including an assault charge while he was
incarcerated.1 22
In Ex parte Lonzada-Mendoza, the court held that as long as the defen-
dant is informed at some time about the ability to pursue further appel-
late review, even if it is in an initial appointment letter before the court
renders an opinion, it satisfies the tests of Stickland v. Washington and Ex
parte Wilson.123
In Mann v. State, the court of criminal appeals held that a defendant
may be found to have used a deadly weapon in a prosecution for a third
offense of driving while intoxicated.' 24 A deadly weapon finding limits a
defendant's eligibility for community supervision and parole. 12 5 The
court did not explain its reasoning, but rather adopted the court of ap-
peals decision without further comment.' 26
In Glover v. United States, the petitioner, who was convicted on labor
racketeering, money laundering, and tax evasion, filed a motion to cor-
rect sentence, asserting that his counsel's failure to argue for grouping of
certain offenses under the Sentencing Guidelines, which added from 6-21
months to his sentence, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 127
The district court denied the motion determining the 6-21 month increase
was not significant enough to amount to prejudice under Strickland v.
Washington.128 The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that the Seventh
Circuit erred in engrafting onto the prejudice branch of the Strickland
test a requirement that any increase in sentence meet a certain standard
of significance. The court took notice that the Seventh Circuit appeared
to rely on Lockhart v. Fretwell, 29 for the holding that there is no relief
when the increase in sentence is not so significant as to render the out-
come of the sentencing fundamentally unfair. The court explained that
Lockhart does not replace the Strickland analysis when the ineffective
assistance of counsel deprives a defendant of a substantive or procedural
right. The Seventh Circuit incorrectly relied on Lockhart to deny relief to
a defendant who might show ineffective assistance of counsel affecting a
sentencing calculation, because the increase in the sentence does not
meet some baseline standard of prejudice. In fact the court's jurispru-
dence suggests that any amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment
121. Id. at 441.
122. Id. at 442.
123. 956 S.W.2d 25 (Tex, Crim. App. 1997).
124. 58 S.W.3d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
125. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(2) (Vernon 2001); TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 508.145, 508.149, 508.151 (Vernon 2001).
126. See Mann v. State, 13 S.W.3d 89, 91-92 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000).
127. 531 U.S. 198 (2001).
128. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
129. 506 U.S. 364 (1993).
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significance.1 30
In Miller v. State, a jury convicted appellant of delivery of less than one
gram of cocaine.131 Appellant also pled true to two enhancement
paragraphs. The court sentenced her to six years confinement. Appellant
appealed, arguing that the trial court erred when it excluded as irrelevant
evidence that the offense was committed under duress.
Appellant testified that she had been threatened with harm if she did
not deliver cocaine to the undercover officer in the case. She testified
that she felt her life was in danger. Appellant further sought to introduce
testimony that shortly after the commission of the offense, the person
who had threatened her harm assaulted her. However, because the as-
sault happened after the delivery of the cocaine, the trial court believed it
to be irrelevant and barred its admission. The court of appeals affirmed
the lower court decision. The court of criminal appeals found that the
evidence was relevant to the appellant's duress defense. The testimony of
the subsequent assault tended to make a consequential fact (the delivery
of the cocaine under duress) more probable than it was without the testi-
mony. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the
testimony as irrelevant based on when the assault occurred.1 32
Kirtley v. State133 appellant pled guilty to murder and was given ten
years deferred adjudication community supervision. He subsequently vi-
olated the terms of supervision and was sentenced to 30 years. The court
of appeals affirmed the judgment. The court of criminal appeals granted
appellant's petition for discretionary review to determine whether it was
error for the court of appeals to have held that the reporter's record from
appellant's punishment hearing was not necessary to resolve his appeal
under rule 34.6(f) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court
reversed and remanded, holding that rule 25.2(b)(3) of the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure did not support appellant's claim that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel at the punishment hearing, because the
rule does not apply to appeals challenging issues "unrelated to" the con-
viction, i.e., issues related to the punishment phase. Therefore, the re-
porter's record was "necessary to the appeal's resolution" pursuant to
Rule 34.6(f), and it was error for the court of appeals to hold that the
record was not necessary. 134
V. HABEAS CORPUS
In Ex parte Weise, the applicant filed a pretrial writ of habeas corpus,
claiming that the information charging him with illegal dumping was un-
constitutional because it did not allege a culpable mental state.' 35 The
130. See Glover, 531 U.S. 198 (2001).
131. 36 S.W.3d 503, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
132. Id. at 508.
133. 56 S.W.3d 48, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
134. Id.
135. 55 S.W.3d 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
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court of criminal appeals reaffirmed its holdings in Ex parte Matthews136
and Ex parte Tamez 137 that habeas corpus is not available before trial to
test the sufficiency of the complaint, information, or indictment unless the
defendant is charged with a statute which is unconstitutional on its face or
the charge is barred by limitations. 138 Here, the applicant did not claim
that the statutes under which he was charged were unconstitutional, but
only that they were unconstitutional as applied in the charging instru-
ment. Hence, the charging instrument was subject to a motion to quash,
and not the subject of a writ of habeas corpus.' 39
In Ex parte Seidel,140 the appellee was arrested for felony driving while
intoxicated and was released on felony bond. The district court dismissed
the prosecution and bail because of the state's failure to present indict-
ment or information. The appellee was then charged with misdemeanor
driving while intoxicated in county court for the same incident. The ap-
pellee filed a special plea of collateral estoppel and a pre-trial writ of
habeas corpus arguing the prosecution was barred by double jeopardy.
The county court granted appelle's application, stating that since the
prosecution was dismissed with prejudice, the state was barred from filing
a lesser charge from the same incident. The state appealed. The court of
appeals affirmed. The court found that while the state was not barred
from filing subsequent charges, the state waived this error when it failed
to appeal the district court's dismissal of the prosecution.
The court of criminal appeals reversed and remanded the judgment of
the court of appeals. The court held that the court of appeals erred in
failing to recognize that the district court judge's dismissal of the prosecu-
tion "with prejudice" was beyond the scope of his authority, and there-
fore that part of the judgment was void. 141 Further, the court stated that
since the trial court's dismissal was void, it may be attacked by either
direct appeal or collateral attack. 42 Therefore, the State was not re-
quired to appeal the district court's dismissal "with prejudice" in order to
bring a subsequent prosecution.
In Ex parte Boyd, the court of criminal appeals held that a finding that
the defendant selected his victim because of bias or prejudice against a
group of which the victim is a member must be made by a jury, not the
court. 43 The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, and the trial
court made an affirmative finding of bias or prejudice, which had the af-
fect of increasing appellant's punishment range to the next highest cate-
gory of offense. The court held that such a finding violated appellant's
136. 873 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
137. 38 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
138. Weisse, 55 S.W.3d at 620-21.
139. Id. at 621.
140. 39 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 58 S.W.3d 134, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
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rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey,144 in which the United States Su-
preme Court held that juries must assess facts that increase the prescribed
range of penalties to which a defendant is exposed.145
In Ex parte Russell, appellant contended that the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice failed to properly credit time he served after being de-
tained for parole violator warrants.' 46 Appellant was convicted for pos-
session of cocaine and was sentenced to five years confinement after his
community supervision was revoked. 147 After he was released from
mandatory supervision, appellant applied for a writ of habeas corpus,
contending that his mandatory supervision should have already expired
had he been properly credited for time he was confined in the present
cause on parole violator warrants. 148 Under the Texas Government
Code, time-credit claims must first proceed through an administrative
process rather through a writ of habeas corpus. 149 However, the statu-
tory provision only refers to "inmates.' 150 Because appellant was already
released on mandatory supervision he was not an "inmate" for purposes
of section 501.0081, and he was free to pursue his time-credit claim
through a writ of habeas corpus.' 51
In Jordan v. State,'52 appellant pled guilty to theft and was placed on
community supervision; he pled guilty to robbery in a separate cause and
was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision. The State
filed motions to revoke in both causes based on appellant's cocaine pos-
session. The district court granted both motions, and appellant filed a
motion for a new trial, contending that his pleas were involuntary. Fol-
lowing a hearing, the district court denied the motion. The court of ap-
peals held that it was without jurisdiction because appellant should have
raised the involuntariness claim in an appeal of the imposition of commu-
nity supervision. The court of criminal appeals affirmed, rejecting prior
cases which held that the original conviction could be attacked on a revo-
cation proceeding if the claims would be cognizable on a writ of habeas
corpus, because such cases created unnecessary confusion and failed to
promote judicial economy. To file a writ of habeas corpus an appellant
must follow the procedure outlined in article 11 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure.
In Tyler v. Cain, 53 appellant filed a state petition for postconviction
relief, contending that a jury instruction in his trial permitted the jurors to
allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which is un-
144. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
145. Boyd, 58 S.W.3d at 136.
146. 605 S.W.3d 875, 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 501.0081 (Vernon 2001).
150. Id. at § 501.0081(b) and (c).
151. Russell, 605 S.W.3d at 877.
152. 54 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
153. 533 U.S. 656 (2001).
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constitutional under Cage v. Louisiana.'54 The district court denied re-
lief, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Appellant
moved the Fifth Circuit for permission to file a second habeas applica-
tion, as required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 ("AEDPA"),155 and the motion was granted. The federal district
court denied relief; and although the Fifth Circuit affirmed, it noted that
the district court erred by failing to determine whether appellant had sat-
isfied AEDPA's requirement that district court's dismiss habeas claims in
a second or subsequent application unless the applicant "shows" that the
"claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to
cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously un-
available." The Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit, holding that the Cage
rule was not made retroactive within the meaning of the statute.
In Ex parte Williams,156 the defendant was improperly sentenced to ten
years probation when Defendant was in fact not eligible for probation.
After the sentencing and after realizing the error, the trial judge revoked
the defendant's probation and sentenced him to ten years in prison. The
defendant filed a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus and the court of
criminal appeals denied it. The court relied in part on Speth v. State, 57
which holds that community supervision is not a sentence or part of a
sentence. This meant that defendant's reliance on Heath v. State 58 was
misplaced because the court's improper grant of probation was not an
"illegal sentence" of the type addressed by Heath. Further, the court held
that the improper grant of probation does not entitle an appellant to a
habeas relief because there is no harm since defendant was not entitled to
probation in the first place. Finally, defendant's argument that he would
have not pled guilty if he had known he would not have received proba-
tion is too speculative for the court to indulge, since the improper aspect
of the probation could not have affected the voluntariness of defendant's
plea.
VI. MANDAMUS
In State v. Court of Appeals for the Fifth District, the State filed a peti-
tion for writ of mandamus seeking an order directing the court of appeals
to vacate an order which granted the real party in interest, David Beck,
mandamus relief on the ground that article 44.04(b) of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure was unconstitutional as applied to him.159 The court
of appeals held that the trial court had a ministerial duty to hold the stat-
ute unconstitutional as applied to Beck. The court of criminal appeals
held that the court of appeals abused its discretion in ordering the man-
154. 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
156. No. 73-845, 2001 LEXIS Tex. Crim. App. - (Tex. Crim. App. April 11, 2001).
157. 6 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
158. 817 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
159. 34 S.W.3d 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
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damus relief.160 A court of appeals abuses its discretion if the relator fails
to show in the court of appeals that 1) he has no other adequate remedy
at law; and 2) under the relevant facts and law, the act to be compelled is
purely ministerial. The court determined that the act sought to be com-
pelled was not ministerial. A ministerial act requires that the Relator
have a clear right to the relief sought and not involve the exercise of
judicial discretion. In the instant case, there was no clear right to the
relief sought as to justify mandamus relief. Since the constitutionality of
article 44.04(b) as applied to the facts of the instant case was an issue of
first impression, the holding of the court of appeals would have required
the exercise of judicial discretion.161
VII. CONFLICT OF LAWS
In Gonzalez v. State,162 the defendant confided in a pastor while in
California that he had done something "real bad." After the pastor
warned the defendant that if there was a victim involved, it could not be
kept secret, the defendant proceeded to confess to a murder. The defen-
dant objected to this testimony at trial, claiming that the communication
was privileged under Texas Rule of Evidence 505, but the trial court let it
in by applying section 1032 of the California Evidence Code. The court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, applying the "most signifi-
cant relationship test" and finding that California law controls because
the communication occurred in California. The court of criminal appeals
affirmed, stating that the privileges are unlike other rules of evidence and
procedure in their peculiar purpose of preserving a substantive right.
VIII. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
In Fiore v. White, the United States Supreme Court, in a per curiam
decision, held that the conviction and continued incarceration of a defen-
dant based upon conduct that a state statute, as properly interpreted, did
not prohibit, violated due process.163 Petitioner, Fiore, was convicted of
operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit. The Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania conceded that Fiore did have a permit, but
claimed he had deviated from its terms so dramatically that he nonethe-
less had violated the statute. The lower courts agreed, and the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court declined to review Fiore's case. After Fiore's
conviction became final, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to re-
view the case of Fiore's co-defendant David Scarpone, who was convicted
of the same crime. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned
Scarpone's conviction on the ground that the statute meant without a per-
mit and that deviation from one's permit was not the same as operating
without a permit.
160. Id. at 927.
161. Id. at 928.
162. 45 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
163. 121 S. Ct. 712.
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However, the Pennsylvania courts refused to grant Fiore collateral re-
lief, and Fiore brought a federal habeas corpus action. The district court
granted the writ. The Third Circuit reversed, believing the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in the Scarpone case had announced a new rule of law
inapplicable to Fiore's case. In responding to the United States Supreme
Court's certified question, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made clear
that its decision in Scarpone was not new law, but instead it clarified the
law at the time Fiore's conviction.
The Supreme Court found that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment forbids a state to convict a person of a crime without
proving all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt and that the failure
to possess a permit was a basic element of the crime for which Fiore was
convicted. 164 The state offered no evidence to that basic element; there-
fore, Fiore's conviction violated due process.
164. Id. at 714.
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